Heiko Gothe: Election to the European Parliament in Germany on June 9, 2024: Debacle for the governing parties, success for parties with restrictive migration policies.
The 2024 European elections in Germany took place against the backdrop of a fundamentally pro-European mood. For most Germans, the EU guarantees protection and safe coexistence in Europe in times of crisis. Peacekeeping and social security were the most important issues for voters. The issue of immigration gained in importance, while climate protection lost ground. The oppositional Conservatives (CDU/CSU) were once again the strongest party – but despite great dissatisfaction with the federal government, they were only able to make small gains. The far-right party AfD came in second place thanks to a significant increase in its share of the vote, driven by its restrictive migration policy. The ruling Social Democrats slipped to a historic low, weighed down by the poor perception of the governing coalition and a lack of confidence in its ability to achieve social justice. The low reputation of the federal government also led to losses for the Greens, who slipped from second to fourth place. They lost popularity as a result of declining interest in the climate protection issue and a drop in confidence. The Liberals, the third ruling party, were able to retain their five seats in the European Parliament. The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance won six seats at the first attempt. The newly founded party was three times as strong in the east of Germany as in the west – based on a programme mix of social policy and restrictive migration policies. The election to the European Parliament in Germany showed all the characteristics of a “national second-order election”: lower interest compared to the last general election, losses by the national governing parties, successes by smaller parties and a dominance of federal politics. In addition, voter turnout was lower than in the last federal election and EU-sceptical parties were successful. [ZParl, vol. 55 (2024), no. 4, pp. 719–748]
Peter Rütters: On the social profile of the German MEPs after the election to the European Parliament 2024.
Since the European elections in 2014, the number of parties elected to the European Parliament (EP) in Germany has more than doubled. The removal of the 5-percent threshold in electoral law gave seven small(est) parties with an increasing number of MEPs (2024: 12) continuous access to the EP. At the same time, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) also gained access to the EP with a growing number of seats (2024: 15 seats); finally, the Sahra Wagenknecht Bündnis (BSW), founded a few months before the election, entered Parliament in 2024 with six MEPs. As a result, the six established parties (CDU, CSU, SPD, Greens, FDP, Left) together only account for around two thirds of the 96 MEPs (2019: 79.2 percent). In 2024, the gains in seats made by the minor parties, AfD and BSW were offset by losses for the Greens (9), SPD (2) and Left (2), primarily as a reaction to the policies of the so-called traffic-light government in numerous conflict situations with a partly domestic and European dimension. With regard to the social profile of MPs – and the prerequisites for a competent and responsible performance of the mandate – there are hardly any differences in the overall high educational backgrounds among MPs. However, pre-parliamentary political and institutional experience – as elements for the professionalization of politics and parliamentary representation – can be found above all in the established parties as informal prerequisites for nomination for a parliamentary mandate. Otherwise, these informal recruitment requirements for a mandate are also gradually gaining ground in the AfD. Differences between established parties and those newly elected to the EP since 2014 can also be seen in the length of parliamentary membership of MEPs; this continuity of membership and experience over several electoral terms, which is functionally necessary for a parliament, is almost exclusively borne by the established parties in the EP. Although the “renewal” of MEPs required for functional reasons was in line with the long-term average of around one third in the 2024 EP elections, the “new” parties accounted for a very high proportion (71.4 percent). The AfD in particular, with 12 new MEPs (80 percent), continued its renunciation of the development of (constructive) European parliamentary competences, in line with its anti-EU program. [ZParl, vol. 55 (2024), no. 4, pp. 749–776]
Stefan Brocza: The Austrian members of the European Parliament: an unknown entity? On the social profile of the MEPs 1995–2024.
Since joining the EU on January 1, 1995, Austria has been represented in the European Parliament by directly elected members. After 30 years of EU membership, this article analyses the social profiles of all Austrian MEPs to date. Age, education, gender parity, renewal rate and previous political experience take center stage. The rather short length of time spent in the European Parliament and the frequent political inexperience of MEPs are identified as particularly significant. However, the eighth EP electoral term (2014–2019) was characterized by extraordinary personnel changes for Austria. The ninth period (2019–2024) saw a rejuvenation of Austria’s MEPs and an increase in the proportion of women. For the first time, there was gender parity. With the start of the tenth period (2024–2029), Austria has taken a step backwards in this respect: its MEPs have become more male and older again. The persistent theory that those who enter the European Parliament no longer play a role in domestic politics can no longer be upheld, at least since the eighth and ninth legislative periods. [ZParl, vol. 55 (2024), no. 4, pp. 777–789]
Moritz Wiesenthal: Revolt in the engine room? Roll-call committee votes of German members of the European Parliament.
Roll-call votes play an important role in parliamentary research, but have so far focused almost exclusively on plenary votes due to a lack of data. In a transparency offensive, the European Parliament decided in 2014 to make roll-call votes compulsory for most votes in committees. This article presents a new dataset containing all roll-call votes of EP committees from 2014 until 2019. The dataset offers a variety of interesting insights beyond the limelight of plenary and opens up a multitude of potential research perspectives. [ZParl, vol. 55 (2024), no. 4, pp. 790–807]
Pieter Beutler, Wim van Meurs & Marieke Oprel: The Dutch and German Greens on the European stage (1968–1984).
With a special focus on the Dutch Politieke Partij Radikalen (PPR) and its sister party Die Grünen in the period 1968 to 1984, this historical study of the early years of the alliance of green parties in Europe provides a new perspective on the roots of green politics in Europe. Comparing the origins of Die Grünen and the PPR shows how the differences in parliamentary structure and political context between the Netherlands and Germany led to similar green ideals taking shape in different party forms. While their green colleagues were still in the early or even preliminary stages of their party formation during the late seventies, the PPR already had representation in the Dutch parliament for more than a decade and more than four years of government experience. The first direct elections to the European Parliament forced parties to look across borders, which led (precursors of) Die Grünen and the PPR to join the same European networks. Due to the unique position of the PPR, they were able to take a leading role in these networks while providing an example of green politics in Europe for their German sister party. [ZParl, vol. 55 (2024), no. 4, pp. 808–826]
Anastasia Pyschny & Calixte Bloquet: The early elections to the French National Assembly on June 30 and July 7, 2024: a risk with far-reaching consequences.
“At the end of this day, I cannot pretend that nothing has happened,” said French President Emmanuel Macron after the far-right Rassemblement National emerged as the clear winner of the European Parliament elections on June 9, 2024. He dissolved the National Assembly, giving the parties little time to explore possible electoral alliances and put forward their candidates. Although the “Republican Front” was able to prevent the far right from winning the elections, the outcome of the second round of voting had far-reaching consequences for the French political system: despite the left-wing electoral alliance winning the elections, Macron appointed the conservative Michel Barnier as prime minister, who led a minority government composed mainly of republicans and centrists until the end of 2024. On December 4, 2024, the new government was ousted. The concessions that Barnier made to the far right in order to be able to pass the 2025 budget were not enough for the Rassemblement National, which joined the left-wing electoral alliance’s motion of no confidence. Barnier’s successor, François Bayrou, a centrist and historical ally of Macron, was appointed Prime Minister on December 13 and presented his government on December 23, 2024. [ZParl, vol. 55 (2024), no. 4, pp. 827–841]
Markus Ogorek: Confidentiality in parliamentary committees of inquiry.
This article examines the constitutionally grounded balance between the principle of transparency and the requirements of confidentiality in parliamentary committees of inquiry. These temporary suborganizations are central instruments of parliamentary oversight, whose transparency, particularly in so-called misconduct inquiries, is essential for maintaining public trust in democracy. At the same time, the protection of state interests and third-party rights necessitates appropriate safeguards, such as the classification of sensitive information. The article analyzes the legal foundations underlying these issues and outlines their practical implementation. It also addresses the criminal, civil service, and labor law consequences of breaches of confidentiality. The findings conclude that the current legal framework generally allows for an appropriate balancing of competing interests, although certain areas require reform. These include, in particular, easing the confidentiality of deliberative sessions. Furthermore, the questioning of prominent witnesses should be documentable in the media under lowered thresholds. [ZParl, vol. 55 (2024), no. 4, pp. 842–857]
Sebastian Wolf: Elected self-regulatory bodies in Germany’s social security system: sectoral parliaments without electorate? On the crisis of the social insurance elections.
In 2023, only 22.4 percent of the members entitled to vote participated in the social insurance elections, i.e. the third biggest election in Germany. Against this backdrop, the paper describes the functions of the sectoral quasi-parliaments in Germany’s social security system. It also analyses causes of the legitimation crisis of these little-known self-regulatory bodies and discusses various reform scenarios regarding the social insurance elections. [ZParl, 55. Jg. (2024), H. 4, S. 858–867]
Kari Palonen: The plan for a supranational parliamentarism. Debates on the draft constitution of the Ad Hoc Assembly for the European Political Community in 1952/53.
The planned European Political Community (EPC) was intended to serve as a political backup for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and for the European Defence Community (EDC) agreed between the six ECSC countries. The so-called Ad Hoc Assembly, consisting mainly of parliamentarians of the ECSC’s Common Assembly, received from the Council of Ministers of the ECSC the task of drafting the constitution for the EPC. After intense debates from September 1952 to March 1953, the Ad Hoc Assembly, in its Draft Treaty, opted for a supranational parliamentary government for the EPC. As is well known, the French National Assembly rejected the plans for the EDC and EPC in August 1954. However, the debates and the Draft Treaty of the Ad Hoc Assembly deserve keen attention as the only proposal until today in favor of a supranational parliamentarism for Europe. This article studies this lost opportunity for a double politicization of European integration in both supranational and parliamentary terms. [ZParl, vol. 55 (2024), no. 4, pp. 868–882]
Thomas von Winter: Access and influence opportunities of interest groups in the German health policy sector.
This paper focuses on a subset of the interest group population in the German health policy sector. Analyzing the invitation lists to all public hearings the health committee of the German Bundestag carried out between the 15th and the 19th election term it is shown in which way the size of the interest group community in the health policy sector and the practice of invitations to the committee hearings developed over time. Another purpose of the analysis is to build up a ranking of interest groups based on the frequency of invitations to hearings that mirrors the distribution of opportunities to get access to, and to exert influence on decisions in health policy. In a next step, propositions are developed on how changes in the invitation practice of the committee and in the composition of the interest group community over time can be explained. For testing these propositions three explanatory factors are taken into consideration: first the development of the total interest group population, second the size of legislative and consultation activities of the German health committee and third the political and institutional context. [ZParl, vol. 55 (2024), no. 4, pp. 883–903]
Andreas Herzig: “One teenager, two votes?” Awarding the vote cast by first-time voters with more weight as an alternative to giving extra votes to parents.
As a result of demographic change, young voters are increasingly losing influence in elections. Children and adolescents below voting age have no voting rights at all, yet are subject to policy and law. Previous proposals to combat these imbalances have been either unrealistic – like the abolishment of the voting age – or in violation of the principle that the right to vote is tied to the person of the voter – like the proposal to let parents vote on behalf of their children. A viable remedy could be to award the vote cast by first-time voters with twice as much weight in order to offset the fact that they had no vote at all up until then. Even though this proposal touches on the principle of equality of voting rights, there are good reasons for it being compatible with the constitution and, in particular, with its “eternity clause”. [ZParl, vol. 55 (2024), no. 4, pp. 904–911]
